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Abstract
What political factors explain the selection of countries for preferential trade agree-
ments by the European Union? I argue that when forming a trade agreement the EU
is more likely to target countries that have a higher degree of political and economic
transparency than other developing countries. In highly transparent countries the
EU is able to monitor effectively whether or not these countries follow its forms of
conditionality, which is the main rationale of EU regionalism. Moreover, economic
and political transparency plays a particularly important role in determining the
degree of flexibility in trade agreements. Evidence based on data from 138 develop-
ing countries supports these arguments.
Key Words: EU foreign relationship, preferential trade agreement, transparency,
flexibility, selection model.
Introduction
What political factors explain a decision by the European Union to enter into a
preferential trade agreement with a developing country? The European Union (EU)
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has been central to the proliferation of preferential trade agreements (PTAs) in the
current wave of “new regionalism” (Mansfield and Milner, 1999).2 For instance,
of the 109 notifications of PTAs to the World Trade Organization as of 1 January
1995, no less than 76 were with the EU or between European partners (Pelkmans
and Brenton, 1999). This emphasis of the EU on PTAs has been explained in part by
the fact that rather than being limited to trade policy, bilateral agreements serve as
crucial instruments of the EU’s foreign policy (Brenton and Manchin, 2003; Messer-
lin, 2001). Specifically, EU bilateralism is the principal tool through which the EU
shapes the structure of the international system in general, and the political and
economic systems of developing countries (Least Developed Countries) in particular.
However, this is just part of the story. From the perspective of LDCs, several studies
emphasize that EU PTAs may also act as a tool of development (Woolcok, 2004;
Whalley, 1998; Rodrik, 1989).3 Indeed, by joining a PTA with the EU, LDCs can
gain access to one of the largest and richest markets, lock in political and economic
reforms, and improve their competitiveness in the global economy. This combina-
tion of elements of foreign policy and development shows that the EU’s selection of
trade partners has crucial political implications.
Despite the magnitude of EU bilateralism and its importance for the interna-
tional trade system, to date, most work on the topic has focused almost exclusively
on economic drivers, such as economic size and the level of economic development
of LDCs (Pelkmans and Brenton, 1999). A number of recent studies on the EU
has explored the role of key interest groups in the formation of PTAs (Aggarwal
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and Fogarty, 2007; Bechtel and Tosun, 2009; Du¨r, 2007). However, from the per-
spective of governance, the EU uses PTAs to push LDCs to implement political
and economic reforms (Schimmelfennig and Sedelmeier, 2004). If conditionality is
not effective due to enforcement problems, EU PTAs are lacking as instruments of
foreign policy and as tools of development. A vast body of literature (Koremenos
et al., 2001; Rosendorff and Milner, 2001; Svolik, 2006) suggests that cooperation
problems may be mitigated by states’ domestic features and by the design of the
agreement. Accordingly, the EU’s decision to pursue PTAs is affected not only by
internal factors, such as the political conflict among interest groups in Brussels, but
also by domestic features of LDCs that in turn influence the design of EU bilater-
alism. As EU Trade Commissioner Mandelson has noted, the EU must construct
ambitious bilateral trade agreements with “carefully chosen partners” (2006: 2).
Focusing on the role of domestic institutions, I empirically address the rationale
for EU bilateralism. Using a political economy perspective, I argue that political and
economic transparency in an LDC affects both the probability of securing a PTA
with the EU and the design of the trade agreement. First, it influences PTA forma-
tion because high transparency makes it easier for the EU to monitor the fulfillment
of the agreement. Second, it affects the design of the PTAs by leading to a high
incidence of discretionary provisions, allowing the EU to correctly identify causes of
deviation on the part of LDCs. To investigate these two dependent variables, i.e.
the probability of forming a PTA and the design of a PTA, I use a two-stage bargain-
ing model that explicitly takes into account the selection bias problem. I test my
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argument using a newly compiled dataset covering 138 developing countries, from
1990 to 2005.
The results of the analysis support my claim that the formation and the de-
sign of PTAs between the EU and LDCs are logically connected. Furthermore, my
findings point to the decisive role of transparency in the probability of an LDC
being selected as a trade partner by the EU. Finally, my results shed light on the
determinants of incomplete contracts in international cooperation. By allowing for
the differentiation between involuntary defection (Putnam, 1988) and opportunism,
transparency significantly increases the probability of designing flexible agreements.
Background
EU regionalism and Conditionality in Trade Policies
The new wave of regionalism features arrangements that involve not only the re-
duction of barriers and what is generally defined as merchandise trade, but also ar-
rangements that regulate trade-related areas. Agreements on issues such as services,
investment, intellectual property, and temporary movement of labor are becoming
common in PTAs. In this regard, the EU has been the most important driver of this
new kind of agreement. In a broad sense, the EU offers access to its large markets for
goods in exchange for access to service markets in LDCs, the LDCs’ acceptance of
rules governing investment and intellectual property rights, and their improvement
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of human rights (Global Economic Prospect, World Bank, 2005). In the literature
this is known as a conditional agreement. Examples of conditionality include the
Copenhagen conditions, in which the EU required former communist countries to
achieve stability of institutions guaranteeing democracy, human rights, and minor-
ity rights, to create a functioning market economy, and to cope with competitive
pressure and market forces (Grabbe, 1999) and the Barcelona Process, which set the
rules of the economic cooperation between the EU and the Mediterranean countries
(Baert, 2003).
Despite the well-known importance of economic factors, e.g. reaping benefits
from economies of scale and reducing transaction costs (Mattli, 1999), as recent
studies have pointed out (Maur, 2005; McQueen, 2002; Holland, 2002), political
conditionality has become one of the key issues between the EU and LDCs. The
EU demands greater accountability by having the LDCs adopt of a series of related
principles that are then evaluated by the EU, such as good governance, democracy,
human rights, and a free market (Holland, 2002: 112). Conditionality can be cat-
egorized in several ways: by political and economic aspects; internal and external
supervision; and positive and negative sanctions. Political conditionality remuner-
ates the implementation of policy in an LDC that promotes the goals of democracy,
human rights, and good governance. Economic conditionality links rewards with
the adoption and promotion of specific microeconomic and macroeconomic policies,
such as structural adjustment programs and liberation. Typically, both political and
economic conditionality are intensively monitored by the EU (Holland, 2002: 119).
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Positive and negative forms of conditionality entail added benefits for adhering to
specific policy guidelines or the threat of disciplinary sanctions in the event that
such guidelines are flouted.
The underlying rationale for the EU using political and economic conditional-
ity in negotiating bilateral trade agreements with LDCs has three facets. First,
the EU aims to promote its rules with the partner country, dictating a hegemonic
harmonization of regulatory policies (Lawrence, 1996). As the former EC Trade
Commissioner Pascal Lamy (2004) put it, “we always use bilateral trade agreements
to move things beyond WTO standards. By definition, a bilateral trade agreement
is WTO-plus.” In other words, the EU exports its own designed policies to gain
bargaining power vis-a`-vis the US at a multilateral level, e.g. in a WTO round.
Second, by exporting its own regulatory standards, the EU strengthens the interna-
tional competitiveness of its firms. Specifically, the application of EU regulations by
an LDC creates a competitive advantage for European producers, making it more
difficult for other producers, e.g. US producers, to sell their products. Third, the EU
aims to stabilize individually unsettled neighbors by connecting them more closely
to the European bloc, and to encourage regional stability through integration (Maur,
2005: 1578). Good governance, for instance, has become a fundamental prerequisite
for sustainable development (Holland, 2002: 121).
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LDCs: Credibility and Adjustment Costs
Despite some limitations on the choice of their own domestic policies, LDCs reap
several benefits from concluding a trade agreement with the EU. First, and most
importantly, forming a bilateral trade agreement with the EU enhances an LDC’s
policy credibility (Whalley, 1998). According to Schiff and Winters, “entering a
PTA entails political sunk costs, and if it requires liberal or sound policies to make
sense, entry provides the government with a signal device, for only a government
with liberal intentions would sign” (2003: 111). Thus, in the presence of asymmet-
ric information about the government, a PTA with the EU can improve credibility.
Although the benefits of North-South PTAs are still a matter of debate among
scholars, there is a wide consensus that by signing these agreements LDCs bolster
their reputation in the global economy and send a positive signal to investors and
companies (Ethier, 1998; Rodrik, 1989). Moreover, Maur (2005: 1578) argues that
improving their existing regulatory framework using the EU template helps LDCs to
correct market failures. Finally, according to McQueen (2002: 1383), an agreement
with the EU can significantly lower transaction costs and uncertainty through the
presence of a regulatory framework. These benefits apply not only to relations with
the EU, but also with the rest of the world.
Increasing policy credibility and political and economic certainty and decreasing
transaction costs are necessary conditions to attract investment and multinational
corporations. In turn, attracting foreign capital and foreign companies allows LDCs
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access to knowledge, markets, and networks. In particular, financial support and
technical assistance may bolster reforms resulting in a further improvement of credi-
bility and political and economic certainty. Indeed, recent studies (Medvedev, 2006;
Velde and Bezemer, 2004; Globerman, 2002; Chakrabarti, 2001) have shown that
PTA membership is associated with a positive change in net FDI inflows and finan-
cial aid and that this positive change is stronger if an LDC enters a bilateral trade
agreement with a developed economy. For instance, according to Benedict de Saint-
Laurent, director of ANIMA, a network of inward investment agencies for Mediter-
ranean countries, political and economic partnership with the EU has prompted
economic, financial, and fiscal reforms in these countries, which have opened up
their economies significantly (Economist, 2008, page 75).
According to the above explanations, both the EU and LDCs have an incentive
to form a PTA. However, carrying out the reforms that the EU demands through
political and economic conditionality involves adjustment costs and it may be reason-
ably expected that not every LDC is ready to sustain such costs. Specifically, under
circumstances where product and factor prices adjust immediately and resources
can be reallocated without cost, the optimal policy would be the simultaneous re-
moval of all distortions. However, in reality things are more complicated. Indeed,
resources cannot be reallocated instantaneously without incurring costs in different
sectors of the economy (Nsouli et al., 2005: 741). Moreover, different markets adjust
to policy changes and price signals at different speeds. For instance, the response of
the production structure, investment, and ownership patterns to economic reforms
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tends to be much slower than the response to financial policies and reforms in such
areas as privatization, tax, and trade.
There are several adjustment costs that an economy may face due to conditionality-
driven reforms. First, since labor and capital are sector specific and thus not readily
transferable between sectors, economic reforms may generate short-term costs in
terms of unemployment and income distribution (Little et al., 1970; Gavin, 1996).
Second, when the budgetary cost of reforms is high, as may be expected when an
LDC wants to honor EU economic conditionality, a reform process may result in in-
flationary pressure (Dewatripont and Roland, 1992; 1994). Third, there is a general
consensus that trade liberalization may lead to loss of government revenues, which
are an important part of an LDC’s budget, as trade taxes are reduced or eliminated
(Baunsgaard and Keen, 2005). In turn, to maintain macroeconomic stability and
to avoid a severe imbalance of payment, governments may be forced to cut social
security and welfare or to raise taxes (Ebrill et al., 1999). Thus, in this scenario,
the majority of the population may show a status quo bias that makes reforms un-
feasible at both political and economic levels.
To conclude, three considerations are crucial for understanding the negotiations
between the EU and LDCs in the context of conditionality. First, adjustment costs
are not trivial in the decision of a developing economy to join a PTA with the EU
and, in the short term, may actually offset the benefits of joining it. For exam-
ple, the negotiations between the EU and the African Caribbean Pacific countries
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(henceforth, ACP) to form a trade agreement have been deadlocked since 2002.
This stalemate is due to the fact that the EU refuses to recognize regional differ-
ences across the ACP. Indeed, African and Pacific countries face significantly larger
adjustment costs in meeting the EU’s conditions than Caribbean countries do, mak-
ing it difficult for them to enter into a PTA with the EU (Oxfam briefing paper,
2007). Second, conditionality-driven reforms introduce an element of uncertainty
into an LDC’s economic system, which may create political pressure for protection
at home. For instance, 300,000 small Algerian firms currently at risk from the com-
petition of European commodities are lobbying protectionist trade policy to their
own government (Magharebia, 23rd January 2008). Third, in relation to LDCs,
a bilateral trade agreement with the EU is likely to produce important distribu-
tional effects, leading to concerns about the division of long-term gains from the
agreement. For instance, case studies show that unskilled workers in Mediterranean
countries are often harmed by trade agreements with the EU (Francois et al., 2005;
Ghesquiere, 1998). In turn, groups that face major economic losses are likely to be
highly mobilized against economic reforms that threaten their interests.
Transparency and Flexibility in EU Trade Bilater-
alism
While the EU wants to maximize conditionality, for an LDC there is a clear trade-
off. On one hand, LDCs benefit from signing a PTA with the EU in terms of
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enhancing their credibility in the global economy. On the other hand, LDCs face high
adjustment costs in carrying out the reforms that the EU dictates through economic
conditionality. This trade-off creates two different, albeit related, problems: the first
concerns the enforcement phase of the agreement; the second involves the design of
the agreement. Each of these two issues are addressed and developed in further
detail in the following two sections.
Credible Commitments and Transparency
Forming a PTA is consistent with the logic of a two-stage cooperation problem.
As several authors argue (Fearon, 1998; Bearce, 2003), the decision to form an
agreement and the decision to fulfill an agreement are strongly connected. If the EU
anticipates that impediments to monitoring and enforcing an agreement would make
a cooperative agreement unstable, it has a low incentive to negotiate (Fearon, 1998:
279), and thus such a cooperative agreement is unlikely to be formed (Leeds, 1999).
In other words, in relation to the formation of an agreement with the EU, LDCs
face a classic time-inconsistency problem that, in turn, undermines the credibility of
LDCs’ commitments. Indeed, in line with LDCs’ previously described preferences,
time-inconsistent policies would lead to higher utility than time-consistent policies.
Specifically, LDCs turn to the EU seeking to gain credibility in the international
economic system. In exchange, they offer the promise of some domestic reforms.
EU conditionality ensures that reforms are implemented despite the temptation to
postpone these reforms or to forego them altogether.4
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Since an LDC has this incentive to renege upon a PTA, the EU must have
instruments to detect and sanction opportunistic behavior. As a large body of co-
operation literature claims, monitoring is as necessary and important as sanctioning,
since “applying the proper sanctioning strategy is difficult when compliance is dif-
ficult to monitor” (Morrow, 1994: 387). More specifically, in the absence of the
capability to monitor and sanction, commitments would not be credible and the EU
would have no incentive to reach an agreement with an LDC. I argue that trans-
parency in economic and political institutions can provide the necessary monitoring
and enforcement functions. When the political and economic system is transparent,
governments will face greater difficulties hiding their actions and avoiding the cost
of opportunism. Moreover, when a government’s preferences are unveiled by trans-
parent political institutions, commitments may be credible even in the presence of
time-inconsistency problems (Broz, 2002). Finally, transparency in governments’
actions is an effective way to bolster the reputation of LDCs, which is crucial in the
case of time-inconsistency problems (Rodrik, 1992). Hence, the first hypothesis can
be stated as follows:
H1: The probability of the EU and an LDC forming a PTA increases with the
political and economic transparency of the LDC.
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Flexibility
As explained above, in implementing the conditionality dictated by the EU, LDCs
face adjustment costs that increase uncertainty and distributional problems at the
domestic level. In turn, uncertainty and distributional concerns increase the strength
of the support for protection at home. I argue that uncertainty is particularly high
in cases of EU bilateralism, since these PTAs are tightly linked to the implemen-
tation of important economic and political reforms. A recent body of literature
(Fearon 1998; Koremenos, Lipson, and Snidal 2001; Kucik and Reinhardt, 2008)
emphasizes the uncertainty that states face about the future costs of compliance in
a repeated-game context. In line with these works, I claim that uncertainty may
endanger the prospects for a bilateral trade agreement in the present, despite the
fact that potential benefits are high for both actors.
To overcome this problem, almost every international agreement allows members
the opportunity to temporarily escape contractual commitments without incurring
excessive retaliation from other partners or without being compelled to renegotiate
costs once they have been forced to withdraw from the agreement. These escape
clauses are often referred to as flexibility provisions. According to Rosendorff and
Milner (2001: 830), flexibility is “any provision of an international agreement that
allows a country to suspend the concessions it previously negotiated without violat-
ing or abrogating the terms of the agreement.” As such, flexibility may encourage
states to enter into cooperative agreements and sustain those commitments over
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time (Kucik and Reinhardt, 2008). Efficient breach clauses are also crucial in the
case of EU bilateralism. Specifically, flexibility allows for the sustaining of coopera-
tion under circumstances when defection by LDCs’ governments is necessitated by
excessively high costs of compliance.
There are two main provisions that are used in trade agreements to allow flex-
ibility: anti-dumping protection and, more importantly, safeguard clauses.5 The
problem with flexibility is that domestic politics constitute private information, as
do domestic political changes. Thus, there exists an incentive for LDCs to misrep-
resent their private information in order to achieve a more favorable outcome in the
bargaining process with the EU. If the EU perceives that monitoring the domestic
politics of an LDC would not be feasible or would be too expensive, it will not allow
the inclusion of the flexibility clauses in the agreement in the first place. Indeed,
the higher the political and economic transparency of the LDC, the lower the asym-
metries of information are and, in turn, the more the LDC is credibly capable of
communicating about “exceptional circumstances” that may occur domestically to
undermine its capacity for compliance. This follows naturally from Bayesian updat-
ing, as the sources of any given defection can be seen as coming from either forced
emergency measures or opportunism, and is in line with previous studies in the field
(Pelc, 2009; Svolik, 2006). Hence, the second hypothesis can be formulated as fol-
lows:
H2: The degree of flexibility of a PTA between the EU and an LDC increases
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with the political and economic transparency of the LDC.
Empirical Analysis: Models and Case Selection
In the previous sections, EU bilateralism has been described as a process of selection
related to domestic institutional features of LDCs. Due to this selection character
of the causal mechanism, some estimation problems occur. Specifically, flexibility
is observable if and only if a PTA is signed, thereby generating a selection bias
problem. In order to deal with these issues and to test the previous hypotheses, I
use the following specification of Heckman selection model known as the HECKIT
model (Grier et al., 1994; Heckman, 1979).
Outcome Equation : yij,t = αXi,t−1 + ε1 (1)
Selection Equation : zij,t = β1Yij,t−1 + β2Wzi,t−1 + ε2. (2)
Where y and z are the dependent variables of the outcome equation and selection
equation, respectively, X is a vector of an LDC’s features that influence the level of a
PTA’s flexibility, Y is the vector of the explanatory variables that affect LDCs’ and
the EU’s decision to form a PTA, and Wzt−1 is a spatial weight matrix constructed
from the number of preferential trade agreements in the sample. Spatial lags of a
dependent variable fulfill a similar function as lagged dependent variables in models
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that account for serial correlation. Instead of simply lagging the dependent variable
in time, values on the lagged dependent variable are brought into the regression based
on (the inverse of) the distance variable (Manger, 2005). A positive coefficient would
indicate that countries are indeed driven to seek preferential agreements if their
neighbors are doing so to avoid the trade diversion effect (Baldwin, 1997; Grossman
and Helpman, 1995; Haggard, 1997; Hirschman, 1981). I label this variable Spatial
PTA.6 Moreover, α, β1, and β2 are vectors of parameters, and ε1 and ε2 are i.i.d.
error terms with a constant mean and finite variance.
Outcome Equation
The dependent variable (DV) of the outcome equation is the variable PTA Flexibilityij,t.
Since the operationalization of flexibility is intrinsically problematic, this variable is
specified using two different indices. Although I acknowledge the difficulties in pro-
viding a systematic measurement of flexibility, the fact that the two specifications
are highly correlated with each other (ρ = .6) indirectly proves the robustness and
coherence of my operationalization. The first indicator is constructed following Ep-
stein and O’Halloran’s (1999: 90-112) measurement of executive discretion. Another
application of this method was implemented by Franchino (2004) to describe the del-
egating power of the EU. It is the discretion in applying legal provisions that a trade
agreement leaves to each member country. More specifically, PTA Flexibilityij,t is
the proportion of provisions in the trade agreement that delegate policy authority
to member states. It is a continuous variable that ranges between 0 and 1 and varies
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a great deal between different PTAs.
The second index is constructed using manual coding of the two aforementioned
sources of flexibility: safeguard clauses and anti-dumping provisions.7 Regarding
the former, I look at the conditions under which LDCs are allowed to use escape
clauses. For instance, some PTAs allowed LDCs to suspend cooperation when “se-
rious difficulties produce major social problems” (Algeria-EU, 2002), whereas other
PTAs include flexibility provisions in relation to sensitive sectors in LDCs, e.g. the
steel industry (Hungary-EU, 1992). The higher the number of conditions under
which cooperation may be suspended, the higher the degree of flexibility. Regarding
anti-dumping provisions, I code whether the agreement includes only anti-dumping
provisions or also incorporates countervailing duties and provisions against subsidies
imposed by member countries. The rationale for considering anti-dumping laws as
discretionary provisions is that a country can take advantage of them to suspend
cooperation in the case of surging costs of compliance. Specifically, anti-dumping
laws are contingent provisions that act as insurance to protect import competing
sectors subjected to price shocks (Fisher and Prusa, forthcoming). As Prusa argues,
“anti-dumping laws have nothing to do with economically harmful practices; rather,
anti-dumping is just a cleverly designed form of protectionism” (2005: 683-684).
Thus, the larger the number of policies, e.g. tariffs, duties, and subsidies, these
clauses cover the higher the degree of flexibility. I group these two conditions in
an index that captures the level of flexibility of a PTA and ranges between 0 and
1. The web appendix provides a more detailed explanation of the method and the
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calculations that have been implemented to obtain these two variables.
The main independent variables of the Outcome Equation measure political and
economic transparency. Specifically, I focus on two dimensions of transparency that
are of primary interest herein since they are in line with the causal mechanisms pre-
viously suggested: predictability of domestic rules and procedures and efficiency of
the political system. Helbe et al. (2009) has a similar specification of transparency.
Predictability concerns rules and procedures applied in a consistent and uniform
manner so as to minimize uncertainty. Efficiency refers to rules and procedures that
minimize the possibility of delays in implementing policies, i.e. political failure, as
well as the possibility to engage in fraudulent and anti-competitive behavior, i.e.
market failure. As Powell and Whitten (1993: 398) point out, transparency is a tool
to create “clarity of responsibility”, i.e. easing the task of attributing outcomes to
the acts of political actors. As such transparency always has a political component.
However, my operationalization of transparency goes further and is closely related
to market issues, which play a crucial role in the enforcement phase of a trade agree-
ment. This combination of political and economic elements is the reason why I refer
to these variables as indices of both political and economic transparency.
Due to the difficulties of capturing domestic institutions, political and economic
transparency has been operationalized in three different ways: using the level of
corruption, of rule of law, and of government effectiveness. Corruption is a proxy
for the predictability of a country’s legal environment and of irregular practices that
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can have major importance during the stipulation of a contract. Rule of Law is a
proxy of effective contract enforcement, of the extent to which laws are observed
and enforced fairly and competitively, and more broadly of respect for the rule of
law. Government Effectiveness takes account of the direct relationship between the
capability of government to credibly commit itself in implementing policies and the
transparency of the economic environment of a given society. All three indicators
are built from the Kaufmann et al. (2006) data set. Since Kaufmann’s indicators
are available from 1996 to 2005, the most recent data available has been used for the
previous years. The measure of political and economic transparency for potential
EU partner countries grows with the values of the three indicators, which have been
rescaled from 0 to 5. Moreover, the Pearson test suggests that these indicators show
significant (at a 95 per cent level) correlation with each other (around .8 for each
variable). Thus, three different models, each one including only one of the three
variables, have been used to test the two hypotheses in order to avoid the collinear-
ity problem.
Other control variables are Other-Than-French Colonyi, French Colonyi, GDPi,
GDPpci,t−1, GDP Growthi,t−1, Tradeij,t−1, Democracyi,t−1, and US PTAi,t−1. Other-
Than-French Colonyi and French Colonyi score 1 if country i has been a colony of
respectively any EU member but France, and France; 0, otherwise. Former colonies
have often maintained close ties with the colonizer and often depend heavily on the
former colonial power in terms of exports. Thus, the bargaining power of former
colonies vis-a`-vis the EU is expected to be lower and, in turn, this is likely to nega-
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tively affect negatively the level of flexibility. I include a separate dummy for French
ex-colonies since it is commonly thought that these may differ in terms of intensity
of trade from non-French colonies (Francois et al., 2006). GDPi,t−1 and GDPpci,t−1
measure respectively the GDP and the GDP per capita of the LDC i in year t− 1.
It may be argued that the level of economic development of LDCs impacts upon the
degree of flexibility of PTAs. In other words, rich LDCs have more bargaining power
vis-a`-vis the EU than poor LDCs. By including these variables, I make sure that
indicators of transparency do not proxy the level of development. GDP Growthi,t−1
is the value of economic growth of the LDC i at time t-1. This variable captures
whether an LDC is risk-adverse, which has proved to be an important variable in
explaining flexibility (Koremenos, 2005). Specifically, countries that experience low
economic growth are supposed to be more risk-acceptant than countries that experi-
ence an economic upturn. The argument is that leaders who anticipate losing office
due to economic downturn are more likely to implement adventurous policies.
Tradeij,t−1 is the log of the value of exports from the EU to the LDC i and from
the LDC to the EU in year t − 1 in constant (t + n) dollars.8 This is the most
common way in which trade flows between pairs of countries are measured in the
economic literature. The amount of trade is expected to influence the number of
anti-dumping clauses. Since anti-dumping clauses have been presented as a index of
flexibility in trade agreements, as trade between the EU and an LDC increases, so
does the level of flexibility. Democracyi,t−1 is based on a 7 point scale that measures
the nature of the regime of LDC i in the previous year. It has been built upon the
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Freedom House data set. Thus, the more democratic the country, the more the EU
trusts said country. In turn, this is expected to have a positive impact upon the
degree of flexibility.9 US PTAit scores 1 if an LDC has signed a PTA with the US
in t − 1 or before. It may be expected that LDCs that have a PTA with the US
have greater bargaining power in negotiations with the EU, since they have already
gained access to a very important market. Thus, these LDCs should be able to sign
a PTA with high flexibility.
Selection Equation
The dependent variable of the selection equation is a dichotomous variable. Specif-
ically, PTAij,t, is a dummy variable which equals 1 if country i and the EU are in
a PTA in year t; 0, otherwise. I take a conservative approach in selecting which
bilateral trade agreements between the EU and LDCs to include in the analysis. I
rely on three different databases, namely the list of regional trade agreements noti-
fied with the WTO, the Tuck Trade Agreements Database, and the McGill Faculty
of Law Preferential Trade Agreements Database, but I exclude partial-scope agree-
ments and agreements that envisage no conditionality, which is the crucial trigger
for my mechanism. For instance, I do not include the Partnership and Cooperation
Agreements between the EU and Kazakhstan (2005) and between the EU and Rus-
sia (2006). These two agreements contain only very general statements on the need
to strengthen economic cooperation between the parties and no binding provisions.
Moreover, these agreements include “only” 12 articles that are less than one third
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of the shortest free trade area treaty signed by the EU, i.e. the PTA with Lebanon.
I end up with 23 preferential trade agreements signed between 1990 and 2005.
Even in the case of the Selection Equation, the main independent variables are
variables that measure political and economic transparency as described in the pre-
vious section. I include several control variables that prove to be important drivers
of PTA formation in general, i.e. not specific to EU bilateralism. Regarding eco-
nomic control variables, GDPi,t−1 measures the GDP of the LDC i in year t − 1.
This variable captures the idea that the larger the market of an LDC, the higher is
the benefit for the EU in joining a PTA (Baier and Bergstrand, 2004). Tradeij,t−1
has been previously described. As trade between the EU and an LDC increases, the
traditional trade gains from tariffs removal increases for the EU and LDCs.
Regarding the political variables, Allianceij,t−1 scores 1 if country i is an ally of
at least one EU member at time t − 1; 0 otherwise. This variable controls for the
possibility that the EU signs a PTA with an LDC for foreign policy reasons (Gowa,
1994). As already said, former colonies have often maintained close ties with the
colonizer and this is expected to make the formation of a PTA more likely. I include
both Other-Than-French Colonyi and French Colonyi, which are both expected to
have a positive coefficient. Moreover, since members of the WTO tend to have sim-
ilar trade policies and similar legal provisions in terms of trade law, e.g. adoption
of anti-dumping provisions, an LDC i that is a WTO members at time t-1 should
be more likely to conclude an agreement with the EU. I label this variable WTOi,t.
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Furthermore, previous research has shown that democratic pairs of countries tend
to sign more PTAs than non-democratic or mixed pairs (Mansfield et al.). Thus, I
include the variable Democracy also in the Selection Equation. Finally, the rationale
for including US PTAi,t−1 is that the EU may react to a PTA signed by the US with
an LDC, e.g. Mexico, to avoid losing trade with this country (Du¨r, 2007) or to push
its own regulatory standard in the international system (Drezner, 2007).
Regarding geographical factors, Distanceij measures the log of distance in kilo-
metres between Brussels and the capital of the LDC i. Indeed, several authors
(Krugman, 1991; Baier and Bergstrand, 2004) claim that the formation of PTAs
is more likely between countries that are geographically proximate. Table 1 of the
web appendix summarizes the descriptive statistics of the variables and their sources.
Mirroring the theoretical framework, the empirical analysis follows a two-stage
process. In the first stage, I endogenize the EU’s decision to select an LDC using
the level political and economic transparency as the main explanatory variable. The
estimated probability of selection is then used as a regressor in the second stage for
analysing the impact of political and economic transparency on the degree of flexi-
bility included in the trade agreement. The previously outlined causal mechanism
implies that political and economic transparency allows LDCs to bargain for more
flexible PTAs with EU. However, since the degree of flexibility of a PTA has an im-
pact upon the probability of its being signed, excluding countries that do not have a
PTA with the EU would cause a severe estimation bias that might lead to incorrect
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inferences. The econometric logic of the Heckman model allows conditioning the
estimated mean function in the second stage on the selection process of first stage.
Moreover, it takes into account that for an LDC the probability of being selected by
the EU affects the likelihood of signing a PTA that includes flexibility provisions.
Furthermore, to account for the duration dependence of the dependent variable in
the selection model, natural cubic splines (with three knots) are included. For the
sake of conciseness, splines are not reported in the econometric analysis. Finally,
since the data set is a panel, to control for potential heteroskedasticity across coun-
tries, the robust Huber-White sandwich estimator is employed.
As mentioned above, the model is tested for a large number of countries. The
unit of observation (country-year) consists of all un-directed dyads between the EU
and LDCs that have available data on institutional indicators. This model is known
as an unbalanced panel. Un-direct dyads are employed here since the first country
in the dyad is considered the country that is targeted, whereas the second is the
EU. The statistical analysis includes 138 countries in the first step. In the second
stage, I exclude countries that did not sign a PTA from the data set leading to a
sample population of 23 countries. The period under observation spans from 1990
to 2005. This leaves me with 2146 observations (country-years) in the first stage
and 175 observations in the second stage.
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Empirical Findings
As previously stated, the first stage of the Heckman model tests whether or not
LDCs form a PTA with EU, analyzing the universe of cases. Results for the two
specifications of PTA flexibility are very similar. In both cases, all three operational-
izations support the argument that high political and economic transparency of an
LDC increases the probability of forming a PTA with the EU with the coefficients
having the right sign and being statistically significant at the .01 levels (see Table 1
and Table 2). Moreover, with the exception of Other-Than-French Colony the sign
of all the control variables, which are statistically significant in the models, is in line
with previous studies, giving added plausibility to the findings. The negative sign of
Other-Than-French Colony is driven by East European countries, which were party
to half of the PTAs under investigation and, are not former EU colonies.
TABLE 1 ABOUT HERE
TABLE 2 ABOUT HERE
Since in the probit model the value of the coefficients is not meaningful, looking
exclusively at the sign and the significance of the coefficient does not allow us to
know the effect of the main explanatory variables on the probability of forming a
PTA. Thus, the predicted probabilities are showed in Table 3 below. Since results
are similar for the two specifications of the dependent variable, I focus the analysis
only on the first. Moving from the minimal value to the maximum value and holding
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the other variables at their averages, the probability of forming a PTA increases by
1.3 (0.4, 2.3) per cent in case of Corruption, by 2.4 (0.4, 5.1) per cent in case of
Rule of Law, and by 2.1 (0.4, 4.7) per cent in case of Government Effectiveness.
Since the formation of PTAs is a rare event in a dyadic setting, these findings are
quantitatively large. For instance, expressed in terms of number of dyads forming a
PTA, my results indicate that 1.2 countries with a high level of rule of law, such as
Estonia or Slovenia, are expected to enter into a trade agreement with the EU in an
average year. This number is noteworthy considering that the EU signed 23 trade
agreements in the period under investigation.10 In addition, the magnitude of these
results is comparable to (and in fact, higher than) the impact of other important
control variables, such as Trade, Democracy, and WTO (Table 3).
TABLE 3 ABOUT HERE
Since a probit model is implemented in the first stage, this allows us to verify
the number of PTAs correctly predicted. In the context of discrete choice models,
McFadden (1984) suggests that if the predicted probability of an event, e.g. a PTA,
for a country pair exceeds one half, this suggests that we should observe that event
for the country pair. Accordingly, the model predicts 19 of the 23 country pairs with
PTAs with a sensitivity of 80 per cent. The model predicts some agreements (e.g.
between the EU and Turkey) that the Baier and Bergstrand (2004) model, which
has a similar specification, did not predict. Three PTAs between the EU and LDCs
were not predicted: Egypt, Lebanon, and Syria. Interestingly, two (Lebanon and
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Syria) of these three countries are former French colonies, suggesting that France
“rewards” former colonies with PTAs more than other colonizers though French
Colony is not statistically significant in the selection equation. Finally, our quali-
tative choice model also allows us to identify for which country dyads bilateralism
might be considered insufficient. Following Baier and Bergstrand (2004: 57), bilat-
eralism is designated insufficient if a PTA is predicted but does not yet exist. Of
115 country dyads without a PTA, 2 pairs were not predicted correctly: Ukraine
and Serbia. Interestingly, the latter country and the EU established a free trade
zone for industrial and agricultural products on 29 April 2008. Table 4 summarizes
these findings graphically.
TABLE 2 ABOUT HERE
The second stage of the Heckman model tests the impact of political and eco-
nomic transparency on the degree of flexibility of a PTA, analyzing a self-selected
sample. Even in the outcome equation, all three operationalizations support the
argument that a high political and economic transparency of an LDC increases the
level of flexibility of a PTA between the EU and an LDC with the coefficients hav-
ing the right sign and being statistically significant at the .01 levels. Moreover, the
impact of the three variables on flexibility is noteworthy. If Corruption rises by 1
unit, the degree of flexibility of a PTA increases by 8 per cent (Model 1) and 13 per
cent (Model 4). In the case of Rule of Law, if this variable increases by 1 unit, the
level of flexibility of a PTA rises respectively by 9 per cent (Model 2) and 15 per
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cent (Model 5). Finally, if Government Effectiveness rises by 1 unit, the degree of
flexibility of a PTA increases by 10 per cent (Model 3) and 14 per cent (Model 6).
Among the other control variables, which are statistically significant, Other-
Than-French Colony, US PTA, GDP Growth, and Trade have the expected sign in
the first specification of Flexibility. Conversely, there is no evidence that the level of
development of LDCs impacts upon flexibility. Moreover, results demonstrate the
superiority of the Heckman model over competing specifications. Specifically, since
%, which measures the correlation between the errors of the first and second stage,
differs significantly from 0, a Heckman model is the only efficient and unbiased
estimator in light of the theoretical framework developed in this paper. Finally,
to check the robustness of the empirical results, a series of changes were made to
the base models. For all these cases, the results are roughly comparable to those
presented above and are available in the web appendix
Conclusion
This paper makes three contributions to the international political economy liter-
ature. First and foremost, I have offered an empirical argument to explain the
formation and the design of bilateral trade agreements between the EU and LDCs.
Specifically, political and economic transparency in LDCs allows the EU to distin-
guish whether a defection is a result of serious domestic circumstances or oppor-
tunistic behavior. This is a crucial finding given the importance of flexibility in
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the cooperation literature. Indeed, as several recent studies have shown (Kucik and
Reinhardt, 2008; Svolik, 2006), formal provisions for breaking treaty commitments
may counter-intuitively boost cooperation relative to what would otherwise be pos-
sible. Second, I show that domestic variables are important drivers in the formation
of trade agreements. Although economic features of LDCs, as well as systemic fac-
tors, prove to be important drivers of EU bilateralism, high economic and political
transparency in LDCs makes them more likely to reach a trade agreement with the
EU. In this sense this article is in line with the findings of recent studies that stress
the importance of domestic institutions in economic cooperation (Mansfield et al.,
2002; 2007; 2008). Third, I provide consistent and generalizable measurements of
flexibility that may be used in analysis of other international organizations outside
of the realm of trade agreements.
Finally, the paper has interesting policy implications. It suggests that North-
South PTAs may act as a complementary tool of development, but not as a substitute
for endogenous political and economic reforms. Specifically, in order to be appealing
economic partners for major economies in general, and for the EU in particular,
LDCs have to reach a certain level of quality of institutions through transition
to a market-economy. The initial steps of this transition must be implemented
endogenously and are crucial for further development. Indeed, the quality of the
institutional framework - the level of transparency exhibited - conditions LDCs’
ability to be selected as trade partners by a major economy, e.g. in this paper, the
EU. Moreover, LDCs’ political and economic transparency conditions the degree of
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flexibility at their disposal to pursue specific development objectives in the light of
specific circumstances. In sum, LDCs seem to perform in a Markovian multi-state
process in which the transition to a higher state of development is a function of the
ability to reach a certain threshold in terms of quality of institutions.
Notes
1Leonardo Baccini is a Postdoctoral Fellow at the IMT Institute for Advanced Studies Lucca,
Via San Ponziano 6, 55100, Lucca, Italy. Phone: +39 0583 4326724. Fax: +39 0583 4326799.
E-mail: baccinil@tcd.ie. The author wishes to thank Randy Calvert, Andrew Martin, Gail McEl-
roy, Thomas Sattler, Robert Thomson, Johannes Urpelainen, four anonymous reviewers, and the
editor for their very helpful comments on versions of this article. A previous draft of this paper
was presented at the 2th conference on the Political Economy of International Organizations in
Geneva, Switzerland, and at ISA 50th Annual Convention, New York, US. The author gratefully
acknowledges financial support from the Government of Ireland Research Scholarship in the Hu-
manities and Social Science (IRCHSS). Part of this paper was written when the author was a fellow
at the Alexander Hamilton Centre for Political Economy at New York University, US. The author
alone is, of course, responsible for the content of this paper.
2Broadly speaking, a preferential trade agreement is an arrangement that liberalizes trade
between members. Here, the term “preferential trade agreement” and the term “bilateral trade
agreement” are used synonymously.
3Using the World Bank classification, I define low-income economies and middle-income economies
as LDCs.
4It may be argued that is more harmful to an LDC’s reputation to not honor an agreement
than to not sign it in the first instance. However, empirical evidence does not support this ar-
gument. Several studies (Steunenberg and Dimitrova, 2007; Anastasakis and Bechev, 2003) show
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that despite a strong wave of North-South agreements, there is a mixed record on compliance with
such agreements. These findings seem to imply that LDCs prefer to secure North-South PTAs and
to obtain the “seal of approval” from developed economies, especially the EU and the US, though
they are not always ready to honor every clause of these agreements.
5All EU trade agreements include safeguards (Woolcock, 2007: 7). There are three forms of
safeguards. Permanent safeguards take the form of a reaffirmation of the EU’s rights under the
WTO. Transition safeguards are those that grant the EU (and its preferential partners) rights to
impose import controls should the FTA lead to an unexpected rapid increase in imports during
its implementation. Finally, there are special safeguard measures that the EU uses for sensitive
sectors, such as agriculture, and offers as special and differential treatment for developing countries.
6Because of the inclusion of a lagged dependent variable, all coefficients computed from this
point estimate need to be interpreted as one period effect (Wooldridge, 2001: 279).
7Kim and Hicks use a similar coding scheme to measure the depth of coverage, i.e. synonymous
with flexibility in their study, regarding 57 PTAs signed by Asian countries.
8Note that the EU is considered the sum of all the member countries in that particular year,
i.e. 12 members until 1993, 15 members from 1994 to 2003, and 25 from 2004.
9The results reported below do not change when using other data sources, such as the Polity
IV score. The correlation between these two measurements of democracy and the three indicators
of transparency is around .4.
10Following Mansfield et al. (2002), these figures are computed by multiplying the predicted
probability of a dyad forming a PTA by the total number of observations (2146) and then dividing
that product by the number of years in the sample (16).
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Table 1: The formation of preferential trade agreements, Heckman Model - PTA
Flexibility 1. Standard errors are in parentheses. ** significant at 1 per cent, *
significant at 5 per cent, † significant at 10 per cent.
Covariates Model 1 Model 2 Model 3
II Stage: PTA Flexibility 1.
Corruption 0.08** (0.03)
Rule of Law 0.09** (0.03)
Govern. Effect. 0.10** (0.02)
French Colony 0.002 (0.03) 0.01 (0.03) -0.03 (0.04)
Other-Than-French Colony -0.02 (0.03) -0.02 (0.03) -0.03 (0.03)
GDP Growth 0.005** (0.002) 0.005** (0.002) 0.003† (0.002)
Trade 0.02** (0.004) 0.01** (0.004) 0.01** (0.004)
US PTA 0.07 (0.07) 0.07 (0.07) 0.06 (0.07)
Democracy 0.01† (.008) 0.02* (0.008) -0.01 (0.01)
GDP -0.04** (0.01) -0.03* (0.01) -0.04** (0.01)
GDP per Capita 0.001 (0.002) 0.002 (0.002) 0.001 (0.002)
% 0.48** (0.09) 0.47** (0.10) 0.46** (0.10)
σ 0.14** (0.007) 0.14** (0.007) 0.14** (0.007)
λ 0.07** (0.01) 0.07** (0.01) 0.06** (0.01)
Rho ≥ χ2 16.06** 16.19** 15.85**
Prop > χ2 0.00 0.00 0.00
I Stage: PTA Formation
Corruption 0.47** (0.16)
Rule of Law 0.73** (0.14)
Govern. Effect. 0.67** (0.16)
GDP 0.17** (0.07) 0.20** (0.07) 0.17** (0.06)
Alliance 0.33 (0.30) 0.36 (0.30) 0.43 (0.30)
Democracy 0.16** (0.05) 0.16** (0.05) 0.14** (0.06)
GATT/WTO 0.90** (0.23) 0.86** (0.23) 0.91** (0.23)
French Colony 0.19 (0.20) 0.39 (0.27) 0.25 (0.27)
Other Than French Colony -0.26* (0.27) -0.63* (0.25) -0.66** (0.25)
US PTA 1.87** (0.28) 1.84** (0.28) 1.86** (0.29)
Trade 0.11** (0.03) 0.10** (0.03) 0.09** (0.03)
Distance -0.98** (0.14) -1.02** (0.14) -1.02** (0.14)
Spatial PTA 59.12** (13.74) 60.34** (13.40) 58.72** (13.16)
Constant 4.15** (1.14) 4.03** (1.10) 4.20** (1.06)
Number of Observations 2146 2146 2146
Number of Censored Observation 175 175 175
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Table 2: The formation of preferential trade agreements, Heckman Model - PTA
Flexibility 2. Standard errors are in parentheses. ** significant at 1 per cent, *
significant at 5 per cent, † significant at 10 per cent.
Covariates Model 4 Model 5 Model 6
II Stage: PTA Flexibility 2.
Corruption 0.13** (0.02)
Rule of Law 0.15** (0.02)
Govern. Effect. 0.14** (0.01)
French Colony 0.04 (0.04) 0.06 (0.04) -0.02 (0.04)
Other-Than-French Colony -0.10** (0.02) -0.11** (0.02) -0.11** (0.02)
GDP Growth 0.001 (0.002) 0.003 (0.002) 0.0003 (0.002)
Trade 0.01** (0.003) 0.01** (0.003) 0.01** (0.003)
US PTA 0.25** (0.05) 0.26** (0.05) 0.02* (0.007)
Democracy 0.02** (.007) 0.03** (0.007) -0.01 (0.01)
GDP -0.01 (0.09) -0.004 (0.08) -0.008 (0.009)
GDP per Capita -0.0002 (0.002) 0.0001 (0.002) 0.001 (0.002)
% 0.23** (0.10) 0.23** (0.10) 0.21** (0.10)
σ 0.11** (0.007) 0.11** (0.007) 0.11** (0.007)
λ 0.02** (0.01) 0.02** (0.01) 0.02** (0.01)
Rho ≥ χ2 4.75* 4.78* 3.75*
Prop > χ2 0.03 0.03 0.05
I Stage: PTA Formation
Corruption 0.41** (0.16)
Rule of Law 0.69** (0.14)
Govern. Effect. 0.62** (0.16)
GDP 0.17* (0.07) 0.20** (0.07) 0.17** (0.06)
Alliance 0.28 (0.30) 0.32 (0.30) 0.39 (0.30)
Democracy 0.16** (0.06) 0.17** (0.05) 0.15** (0.06)
GATT/WTO 0.90** (0.24) 0.84** (0.24) 0.88** (0.24)
French Colony 0.28 (0.28) 0.39 (0.28) 0.28 (0.27)
Other Than French Colony -0.61* (0.27) -0.65** (0.25) -0.66** (0.25)
US PTA 1.75** (0.29) 1.74** (0.29) 1.73** (0.29)
Trade 0.11** (0.03) 0.09** (0.03) 0.09** (0.03)
Distance -1.02** (0.14) -1.05** (0.14) -1.05** (0.14)
Spatial PTA 61.63** (13.70) 63.10** (13.45) 61.79** (13.23)
Constant 4.80** (1.13) 4.50** (1.09) 4.62** (1.07)
Number of Observations 2146 2146 2146
Number of Censored Observation 175 175 175
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Table 3: Entries are changes in the predicted probabilities of Corruption, Rule of
Law, Government Effectiveness, Trade, Democracy, and Distance. All values are
evaluated at the average value of the other control variables. First differences of
Trade, Democracy, and Distance are calculated in Model 3. 90 per cent confidence
intervals are in parentheses.
Economic and Political Transparency [min, max]
Corruption 1.3 (0.3, 2.3)
Rule of Law 2.4 (0.4, 5.1)
Govern. Effect. 2.1 (0.4, 4.7)
Main Control Variables [min, max]
Trade 0.5 (0.01, 1.3)
Democracy 0.4 (0.1, 1.5)
WTO 0.3 (0.1, 0.5)
Distance 14 (4, 27)
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Table 4: Cases correctly predicted by the models, cases not predicted, and case of
insufficient bilateralism.
PTAs correctly predicted PTAs not predicted Insufficient Bilateralism
Algeria Egypt Ukraine
Bulgaria Lebanon Serbia
Chile Syria
Czech Republic
Estonia
Croatia
Hungary
Jordan
Latvia
Lithuania
Macedonia
Mexico
Morocco
Poland
Romania
Slovakia
Slovenia
Tunisia
Turkey
South Africa
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